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Abstract
It is notoriously difficult to make distributed systems re-
liable. This becomes even harder in the case of the
widely-deployed systems that are heterogeneous (mul-
tiple implementations) and federated (multiple adminis-
trative entities). The set of routers in charge of the Inter-
net’s inter-domain routing is a prime example of such a
system. In this paper, we argue that a key step in mak-
ing these systems reliable is the need to automatically
explore the system behavior to check for potential faults.
We present the design and implementation of DiCE, a
system for online testing of heterogeneous and feder-
ated distributed systems. DiCE runs concurrently with
the production system by leveraging distributed check-
points and isolated communication channels. DiCE or-
chestrates the exploration of relevant system states by
controlling the inputs that drive system actions. While
respecting privacy among different administrative enti-
ties, DiCE detects faults by checking for violations of
properties that capture the desired system behavior. We
demonstrate the ease of integrating DiCE with a BGP
router and a DNS server, the building blocks of two vi-
tal services in the Internet. Our evaluation in the testbed
shows that DiCE quickly and successfully detects three
important classes of faults, resulting from configuration
mistakes, policy conflicts and programming errors.
1 Introduction
Many successful distributed systems are inherently het-
erogeneous and federated — heterogeneity arises from
the creation of multiple, inter-operable implementations;
federated refers to the existence of multiple service
providers operating under different administrative do-
mains. The Internet’s inter-domain routing system gov-
erned by BGP is a prime example of a heterogeneous
and federated system. Other such systems include DNS,
electronic mail, peer-to-peer content distribution [16],
content and resource peering [8], computing grids, and
Web services. However, the resulting competing envi-
ronment of mutually mistrusting providers fosters a ten-
sion between a provider’s own goals versus the common
overarching desire of keeping the federated system func-
tioning properly.
In such an environment, making distributed systems
reliable does not stop with the already difficult task of
producing a robust design and implementation. Achiev-
ing high reliability also bears the difficulties in deploy-
ing and operating these systems whose aggregate be-
havior is the result of interleaved actions of multiple
system nodes running in a heterogeneous and failure-
prone environment. In fact, several factors such as subtle
differences in the details of inter-operable implementa-
tions, or system-wide conflicts due to locally admissi-
ble (mis)configurations can cause harmful node interac-
tions that lead to faults, i.e., deviations of system compo-
nents from their expected behavior. These faults which
span the state and configuration across multiple nodes
are perhaps less frequent than single-machine bugs, e.g.,
memory-related issues. However, when these faults man-
ifest themselves they have far-reaching and substantial
negative impact, and require considerable resources to
be diagnosed and eliminated.
For example, a BGP router can rightfully decide to
reset its peering session in response to a syntactically
valid, but semantically ambiguous message. However,
when many of such routers are coupled with another
large number of routers that propagate the ambiguous
message (because of a different message parser imple-
mentation), the overall effect is a large fraction of routers
that are continuously resetting and restoring sessions as it
happened in several episodes [4]. The resulting high up-
date processing rate causes a performance and reliability
problem. Others have argued that a malformed packet
could take down a significant fraction of the Internet [1].
Even with a 100% protocol-compliant message, such an
incident inadvertently occurred in August of 2010 [3].
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Our overarching vision is to harness the continuous
increases in available computational power and band-
width to improve the reliability of distributed systems.
We argue that nodes in the system and their adminis-
trators should be proactively working towards finding
which node actions could potentially lead to faults. This
task cannot be done only locally by checking the single-
node behavior, as the erroneous system state can span
multiple nodes and remote node configurations are not
available locally. Thus, detecting faults in the general
case requires some collaboration among the nodes. The
faults these actions lead to are evidence of possible fu-
ture system failures which may be avoided by detecting
these potential faults.
To detect faults, we propose to automatically explore
the system behavior alongside the production system,
but in complete isolation from it using a system snap-
shot captured from the current state. That is, we check
system-wide consequences of actions nodes can under-
take, and output actions that lead to failures. In practice,
node actions are the result of subjecting the node’s code
in its current state to messages, configuration changes,
failures, random choices, etc., collectively called inputs
in the following. Ideally, we want to subject nodes to a
large number of possible inputs that systematically exer-
cise their behavior.
We have to address several difficult challenges [13] in
our work. The federated nature of many deployed sys-
tems means that a node cannot gain unrestricted access
to other nodes’ state and configuration. Moreover, we
have to carefully manage the information flowing be-
tween system participants to preserve their confidential
nature. The heterogeneity of the system makes it diffi-
cult or impossible to have local access to the source or
binary code of other participants. Systematically explor-
ing node behavior even for a single node easily runs into
the problem of exponential explosion in the number of
code paths that need to be explored. Finally, the sheer
size of the system can pose scalability problems.
Static analysis of configuration files [19] cannot be ap-
plied to this problem because it does not take into ac-
count the actual state and software of the system. Tools
for predicting inconsistencies using live model checking
(e.g., [44]) cannot be used because they require a node
to (i) retrieve checkpoints (with private state and config-
uration) from other participants, and (ii) obtain access
to the source code of other participants. Applying sys-
tematic source code exploration tools based on symbolic
execution from initial state [11, 39] cannot explore code
paths sufficiently deep due to exponential growth in the
number of possible paths caused by having large inputs
(configuration and messages received over a long time).
In this paper, we introduce DiCE, a system for online
testing of heterogeneous, federated distributed systems.
Accounting for the federated nature of the system, we let
each node autonomously explore its local actions. We
use a set of lightweight node checkpoints to allow the
single node’s actions reach out to other nodes as a way to
drive and explore system-wide state in isolation from the
production environment. To preserve privacy between
different administrative domains, we define a narrow in-
formation sharing interface that enables a node to query
remote nodes for relevant state checks. We detect faults
by checking and flagging violations of given properties
that, tying together state checks over multiple system
nodes, capture the desired system behavior. These fea-
tures enable the basic “what-if” exploration block that
can be used in three different ways. First, it can be used
to test for the outcome of a single input or configuration
change. Second, to enable checking for insidious faults
due to corner cases, remote node failures and different
local choices, we enable the developer to encode these
choices in a simple function that DiCE can then exercise.
Finally, to systematically exercise possible node actions
and check for the faults they might induce, we use a tech-
nique called concolic execution [10, 17, 23] to automat-
ically produce the inputs that explore all possible code
paths at one node. We overcome the problem of expo-
nential explosion of code paths by starting exploring the
node behaviors from current system state, and by sub-
jecting the node’s code to small-sized inputs that affect
localized parts of state-changing code.
We demonstrate DiCE’s ability to detect insidious
faults in two systems that provide fundamental services:
BGP and DNS. By doing so, we demonstrate the benefits
of having a framework that enables system operators to
specify the desired behavior in the form of safety prop-
erties, and learn about possible faults and their impact.
DiCE is a crucial step in being able to guard against
important classes of faults. Advance warnings can be
used to notify the system operator(s) about a particular
misconfiguration, or to trigger automatic installation of
a filter against the problem caused by the software re-
action to an unanticipated message. A particular benefit
of our approach is that the separate administrative enti-
ties can use DiCE by integrating only their source code
with it, and without requiring access to the source code,
executable, or configuration of other participants.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. We describe the design and implementation of
DiCE, a system for detecting possible faults in heteroge-
neous, federated environments that imposes light over-
head and resource requirements.
2. We provide a technique for automatic and
lightweight distributed snapshot creation that (i) respects
trust boundaries, and (ii) allows system behavior to be
explored in isolation. This technique effectively enables
node actions to extend their reach across the network to
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explore relevant system state. We believe that this prim-
itive can be successfully applied to other “what-if” ex-
ploratory scenarios.
3. We demonstrate how a small amount of input-
producing code can be used to drive execution across
the relevant federated distributed system states. Doing
so uncovers faults due to events that are difficult to ex-
plore, such as remote node failures. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first such approach.
4. We integrate DiCE with the BIRD [5] open-source
router written in C. In our evaluation on the network
testbed with Internet-like conditions, we demonstrate
that DiCE quickly detects two important classes of faults
that have affected the Internet: (i) Internet-wide BGP
session resets, and (ii) policy conflicts among ISPs.
5. We integrate DiCE with the MaraDNS [2] open-
source DNS server, and demonstrate its ability to detect
cyclic zone dependencies – an insidious type of DNS
misconfiguration that can render entire domain names
unresolvable [37].
2 Design
To detect faulty states (those in which the system com-
ponents deviate from their desired behavior), our goal is
to continuously and systematically explore the behavior
of a distributed system. In this section, we first offer an
overview of how DiCE meets this goal. We then discuss
each aspect of our design in detail, together with its ra-
tionale and principles.
Overview DiCE runs online, alongside a deployed sys-
tem, off the critical execution path. Figure 1 gives a high-
level illustration of how DiCE tests running distributed
systems. First, one node in the system acts as an explorer
(node marked with a double ellipse in step 1 of Figure 1).
The explorer triggers the creation of a shadow snapshot,
i.e., a consistent and distributed snapshot composed of
nodes’ local checkpoints based on the current state of the
system (step 2). Then, DiCE exercises a variety of local
behaviors at the explorer that result in exploring system-
wide relevant states. As detailed later, the code, current
state, and inputs fed to the code determine how a node
behaves. Thus, DiCE uses a combination of techniques
to carefully construct the inputs that systematically ex-
plore node behavior.
The execution of each node behavior occurs in isola-
tion, over a clone of the shadow snapshot. The messag-
ing is also confined to the cloned snapshot. Each cloned
snapshot represents one instance of possible system be-
havior involving multiple nodes. DiCE detects faults by
checking for violations of given safety properties in each
cloned snapshot.
Using DiCE DiCE enables three modes of online test-
ing. First, it allows for a single input or configuration
2. Establish consistent shadow snapshot 
of isolated, local node checkpoints
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3. Explore input/config change
over a lazily cloned snapshot
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Figure 1: DiCE explores and checks system behavior over iso-
lated snapshots. DiCE determines the result of each exploration
by summing up 0 or 1 outputs of functions that run locally.
change to be presented at the explorer (basic “what-if”
building block). Second, it allows for systematic explo-
ration of federated system states. DiCE user does this
by writing and calling from the code a choice function
that locally mimics remote node and network failures,
random choices, etc., and writes the code that uses the
return value to perform one of many possible actions.
This type of exploration involves explicitly enumerat-
ing and exploring multiple individual inputs or config-
uration changes, and it uses the basic “what-if” block
for each such case. Third, DiCE can systematically and
automatically explore the code paths for relevant mes-
sage handlers at the explorer. This feature is highly rele-
vant in cases in which the code dominates node behavior,
e.g., when a configuration file is interpreted on-the-fly
or when message parsing code can create failures. This
mode effectively allows the explorer node to judge its
potential system-wide impact.
2.1 Exploring system behavior in isolation
In this section we describe the basic building block
of DiCE: testing with the single input or configuration
change, and gauging its impact across the neighborhood
on a node in a manner that respects privacy. DiCE does
this in isolation from the production system, starting
from a consistent snapshot of its current state [33].
2.1.1 Checkpointing state across nodes
Despite all the best efforts in thorough local testing and
configuration checking, there is no substitute for having
the ability to inspect distributed system state for potential
faults. This is challenging because the federated nature
of the systems we target makes it impossible to simply
retrieve state checkpoints from other nodes. Moreover, it
may be impossible to have the exact copy of the software
running at other nodes, as the system is fundamentally
heterogeneous. Finally, the entities controlling different
nodes might not be willing to reveal their configurations.
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A snapshot that respects trust boundaries Presented
with these constraints, we decide to let nodes keep their
state, code and configuration in a local checkpoint. A
checkpoint never leaves the node that creates it. How-
ever, the checkpoint has the ability to clone itself and re-
sume execution from its saved state and to communicate
with checkpoints belonging to other nodes. This way,
a node that wishes to explore its behavior can do so by
creating and executing inside a shadow snapshot, i.e., a
consistent, distributed set of individual node checkpoints
of the explorer’s neighborhood.
The explorer establishes a snapshot by sending an an-
notated message to its immediate neighbors, which for-
ward the message further on to their neighbors, etc. until
a desired scope is reached.
Isolating execution in a snapshot To prevent the ex-
ploratory executions from changing system state, each
node checkpoint is isolated from its environment. For
example, all outgoing messages are intercepted and, in-
stead of being transmitted over existing connections, are
sent over shadow connections that the checkpointed node
creates to the message destinations.
2.1.2 Detecting faults while respecting privacy
We detect faults by checking for violations of safety
properties in the cloned snapshots. These properties are
user-specified and we assume that they capture system-
specific invariants or describe the desired system behav-
ior. Some systems were designed with these types of
properties in mind. When that is not the case, the prop-
erties can capture the best system practices and the post-
mortem analysis of insidious faults that have previously
occurred, as is the case with BGP [25]. In addition, ap-
proaches exist to automatically infer safety properties in
distributed systems [43].
Checking properties across domains Let N be the
set of nodes, and Θi, i ∈ N denote the set of
node’s i states executing in the cloned snapshot. A
property, or global check, is expressed as a function
g(Θ1,Θ2, · · · ,Θ‖N‖) ∈ {0, 1}. Note that a global
check considers system-wide behavior and may poten-
tially require accessing information at multiple nodes in
different administrative domains.
To control the information shared across domains, we
introduce a narrow interface. We consider a subfam-
ily of global checks for which g(Θ1,Θ2, · · · ,Θ‖N‖) =
1 if [
∑
i∈N f(Θi)] > th, 0 otherwise; where f(Θi) ∈
N0 is a check that only accesses local state and th is a
property-specific threshold (e.g., 0).
In this scheme, a centralized entity (e.g., the explorer)
computes the global check as the sum of local check val-
ues1. To preserve privacy, the output of a local check
1A global check is decomposed into local checks; this might require
an ad-hoc protocol as we show later for detecting policy conflicts.
should not contain any private information. For exam-
ple, local checks can be written as: was there a certain
change in the node’s state? However, we anticipate there
could be cases when individual domains are not willing
to disclose local checks unless anonymity can be guaran-
teed, e.g., if a local check necessarily leaks private infor-
mation. At the expense of increased computational com-
plexity, we can control information sharing by securely
summing local check values so that only the final out-
come is known to participating nodes and single addends
are not known. Appendix A discusses one such scheme
for providing anonymous property checks.
2.2 Driving exploration of system behavior
The key step in detecting potential faults is to explore
possible system behaviors. In practice, the aggregate be-
havior is the result of interleaved actions of multiple sys-
tem nodes. To explore system behavior under different
scenarios, we could take a position atop the system from
where we would control all individual node actions and
their interleaving2. Unfortunately, this principle would
create the need for a third party responsible for orches-
trating state exploration in the targeted federated sys-
tem. Also, when considering a large-scale system, sev-
eral scalability issues would arise.
Because we want to let the nodes (and administrative
domains) maintain control of how they participate in the
system state exploration, we propose a different princi-
ple — focus on local actions of one node and let the ex-
ploration of a single node’s behavior reach out to other
nodes as a way to explore system state. This kind of ex-
ploration can take place one node at a time, in parallel,
or a combination thereof.
What drives node behavior In practice, the behavior
of each node is determined by the path taken through its
code. Keeping in mind that we resume execution from
a local node checkpoint, we note that the code that will
execute next is affected by (i) the current state and (ii)
what we collectively term as inputs. As illustrated in
Figure 2, the inputs encompass a variety of sources and
events: e.g., messages, configuration changes, timers.
Other less explicit inputs are events such as node failures
and random choices. Next, we discuss the three modes of
DiCE’s operation that progressively cover an increasing
number of possible inputs.
2.2.1 Testing a single input or configuration change
Testing a single input or configuration change is straight-
forward, and reuses the basic “what-if” exploration
building block. This testing mode is useful for quickly
checking whether a particular configuration change is
2Commonly done for model checking distributed systems [30, 45].
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Figure 2: DiCE explores executions from live state, and pro-
vides a number of means of controlling inputs that it can use to
explore system-wide behavior. Exploration occurs in parallel
with the production system.
safe, or whether a change to a message will not have
detrimental effect elsewhere in the system.
The node serving as the explorer, runs a controller,
which starts by demanding the creation of a shadow
snapshot (Section 3 describes the mechanism we adopt
in our prototype). To explore a particular input, the
controller instructs the explorer’s shadow checkpoint to
clone itself, and then resumes running from this cloned
checkpoint. Once the exploration with a particular input
completes3, the cloned snapshot is checked for faults as
described before.
2.2.2 Testing under network failures and different
local choices
The second mode of testing is useful for examining sys-
tem behavior under a variety of conditions and corner
cases that might be difficult to test otherwise: remote
failures, sequence of random choices, etc. The goal here
is to test for faults either prior to contemplating a config-
uration change, or in steady-state.
As shown in Figure 2, a variety of means can be used
to enable DiCE to drive the explorer’s behavior to reach
relevant federated system-wide states. However, how to
identify all these inputs is an open question which might
not have a general solution. In our experience, we find
that leveraging domain knowledge is an effective approx-
imation. For instance, anticipating some of the discus-
sion from the next section, we identify that a key aspect
of DNS name resolution is the random choice in query-
ing one of many possible name servers for a given do-
main name. This driver of node behavior is easy to rec-
ognize and, when encoded in a choice function that DiCE
can use to effect a fault, configuration change, or some
other input in general. By doing so, DiCE can explicitly
enumerate possible federated system states that are the
3Deciding on the termination of a distributed computation is a well-
understood problem [32] (Section 3.8.5).
result of nondeterminism including remote node and net-
work failures, random choices, etc. that is similar to the
approach taken by explicit state model checkers [46] for
single-machine code. Interestingly, property definitions
may give hints as to what inputs need to be exposed. For
example, persistent oscillations in BGP can be caused by
conflicting policies at different administrative domains.
Policies are encoded in router configuration. Treating a
policy configuration change as an input enables to exer-
cise the BGP route selection process and find potential
conflicts lurking in the configuration.
2.2.3 Systematically exploring node behavior
Because node behavior depends on the inputs, we might
want to explore a node’s behavior by subjecting the node
to a variety of possible inputs in a way that systematically
exercises its code paths. Given that this process is bound
to take longer, this model of testing is useful in steady-
state of the system, when we are interested in using the
time to proactively find as many faults as possible.
The literature presents us with a technique for this pur-
pose (automatically generating test cases from the code
itself). In software testing, symbolic execution [11] is a
technique that explores all possible code paths in a pro-
gram — symbolic execution treats the input variables of
the program as symbolic inputs, and during execution
collects the constraints that describe which input values
can lead to a particular point in the code. Albeit pow-
erful, this technique comes with significant program ex-
ecution overhead and, more problematically, it does not
easily interact with the environment due to the abstrac-
tion of symbolic values.
As these two aspects are crucial for testing a real sys-
tem that runs over the network, we look at a variant of
symbolic execution called concolic execution [10, 17,
23] which easily interacts with the environment and has
less overhead. This technique executes the code with
concrete inputs, while still collecting constraints along
code paths. To drive execution down a particular path,
the concolic execution engine picks one constraint (e.g.,
branch predicate) and queries the satisfiability solver to
choose a concrete input that negates the constraint. As
shown in Figure 2, this technique for automatically gen-
erating the inputs is optional and ties seamlessly together
with the rest of DiCE.
To exhaustively explore node behavior, we would ide-
ally explore all possible paths at the each node. While
concolic execution is in theory capable of exploring all
possible code paths, in practice it is severely limited as
the number of paths to explore grows exponentially with
the number of branches in the code and the size and
number of the inputs (think of each invocation of an if
statement that checks for end of input as an additional
branch). We discuss later in this section our insights for
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dealing with this problem.
Exercising node behavior to test system states The
explorer uses a previously encountered real input (e.g.,
a message) to record the constraints encountered on the
code path executed with that input (e.g., by invoking
a message handler). This initial set of constraints are
then passed on to the concolic engine. After complet-
ing the initial constraint recording, the concolic engine
starts negating predicates one at a time, resulting in a
set of inputs, each of which satisfies a particular con-
straint. To explore a particular input and check for its
outcome, the explorer uses the basic “what-if” mecha-
nism (the shadow snapshot is made only once and then
used for cloning).
The constraints during this new execution path at the
explorer node are once again recorded and fed to the con-
colic engine, which then updates the aggregate set of
constraints and keeps producing new inputs. Updating
the aggregate set is important for achieving full cover-
age, since the previous runs might not have reached all
branches that exist in the code.
When dealing with symbolic messages we observe
that concolic execution easily ends up creating many in-
valid inputs that simply exercise the message parsing
code. Also, if the message format allows for variable
length fields, we note that concolic execution has dif-
ficulties in producing messages where such fields are
shrunk or grown. Therefore, we find it useful to use
grammar-based whitebox-fuzzing [22] which leverages
knowledge of the message format to produce a large
number of inputs that quickly pass validation checks. We
apply the fuzzing code before the message handlers, and
rely on the domain knowledge to identify these handlers.
Countering exponential explosion of code paths In
addition to a thoughtful choice of symbolic inputs, we
have two key principles for dealing with the path explo-
sion and large input problems: 1) start the exploration
from current system state (the shadow snapshot). Doing
so eliminates the need to replay from initial state a poten-
tially large history of inputs to reach a desired point in the
code, and 2) explore behaviors that are a result of small
inputs, both size-wise and in number. The intuition is to
try to reach faulty states that are small deviations from
current state rather than being more exhaustive with the
associated exponential increase in states.
2.2.4 Preventing information leakage
Ideally, the data that is crossing the trust boundary among
the nodes should not reveal any confidential information.
At a high level, we observe that there are two main kinds
of information that can be leaked: potential node behav-
ior and configuration data.
Leakage of node behavior is a direct consequence of
systematic code path exploration. We argue however that
in a long-running system the behavior has already been
revealed for at least the most common set of code paths.
Configuration data can be leaked if the executed code
paths produce messages containing a direct copy of the
configuration data or an indirect manipulation thereof
from which the configuration data can be reverse engi-
neered. However, using concolic execution aids in in-
formation hiding. When the concolic engine wants to
negate a constraint, it can pick any random value that
negates the constraint to drive execution. Thus, the ran-
domized nature of these inputs limits this kind of infor-
mation leakage. In addition, we can annotate what data
is confidential and avoid recording constraints from the
code that handles the confidential data so that it cannot
leak into the inputs the concolic engine produces.
Additional measures can be taken, including: (i) rate
limiting the exploration or responses to property checks,
or (ii) refusing certain explorer nodes altogether in the
absence of any trust. In our future work we will do a
thorough study of the security-related aspects of DiCE.
2.3 Discussion
A number of issues, such as the (possibly parallel) or-
der in which the nodes act as explorers, the size of the
shadow snapshot, and the amount of resources devoted
to exploration at each node are application-specific and
orthogonal to this paper; we discuss them in more de-
tail in [12]. Here we only note that it is possible to limit
resource consumption during exploration using existing
primitives on many platforms.
Limitations The types of faults we can detect are a sub-
set of faults that can be detected in a general distributed
system [26]. We do not attempt to verify algorithms, pro-
tocols, or the operating system of the node. We do not in-
corporate Byzantine faults. To help it deal with this type
of faults, DiCE could directly benefit from schemes that
ensure accountability [25]. Further, we only check for
known classes of faults that are captured in the supplied
system-specific properties. We rely on the programmer,
experienced system operator, or an automated tool [43]
to identify these properties.
As with any fault detection solution, the potential
DiCE issues are false positives and false negatives. DiCE
can exhibit false negatives if the given properties are not
capable of discerning the faulty state. False negatives
also arise when there exists no code path that the con-
colic engine can exercise with small inputs to reach a
faulty state. False positives are less of a problem, as the
live execution over the cloned snapshot is evidence of be-
havior that is the result of processing a particular input.
However, the properties themselves should be defined in
a way that avoids false positives.
Note that the set of inputs that systematically covers
6
message handling code on one node might not result in
full path coverage of other participants (when they run
using the inputs they receive in the shadow messages).
We cannot easily accommodate system-wide coverage
because we would need to share constraints with remote
nodes and we deem this unfeasible because of privacy
considerations. However, our evaluation with BGP and
DNS demonstrates that important classes of faults can be
detected without having system-wide path coverage.
Finally, DiCE is not a bug-finding tool that could be
used to pinpoint the location of programming errors.
DiCE is neither a traditional fault detection tool in the
sense that the faults it can find are not detected in the live
production system, but rather by reaching faulty states in
the cloned snapshots.
3 DiCE prototype and applications
This section discusses our DiCE prototype and its appli-
cation to two federated, heterogeneous distributed sys-
tems: BGP and DNS. For each case study, we present
a brief overview of the target distributed system and de-
scribe how we integrate DiCE with it.
Our prototype consists of a concolic engine, a part
written in C and integrated with the target systems, and
a Python implementation of the DiCE controller. We use
the Oasis [17] concolic engine as the basis for code path
exploration. Oasis instruments C programs to record
constraints on symbolic inputs during program execu-
tion. We discussed in [12] the modifications we made in
Oasis. These include support for exploring from current
state and the ability to use a single executable where both
the original and instrumented code co-exist for avoid-
ing performance overheads in the deployed system while
recording constraints during exploration. In addition, in
this work we change the Oasis filesystem/network model
to manage shadow connections.
3.1 Integration with BGP
Here, we present the BGP case study, and use it to de-
scribe the details of our DiCE prototype. We start by
providing an overview of BGP. We then discuss the in-
tegration of DiCE with the BIRD [5] open-source rout-
ing daemon. BIRD is written in C and supports multiple
routing protocols. It is in production use serving as a
route server in several Internet exchange points.
3.1.1 BGP overview
The Internet consists of tens of thousands of domains, so-
called autonomous systems (ASes). ASes are typically
administered by Internet Service Providers (ISPs). While
the ASes have freedom in choosing their intra-domain
routing protocol, Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [38]
is the inter-domain routing protocol that acts as the glue
that ensures universal connectivity in the Internet and is
spoken at each border router.
Each BGP speaker maintains a routing table, or Rout-
ing Information Base (RIB) that associates a route to a
network prefix with the next hop router and the list of
ASes (AS PATH) that needs to be taken to reach a given
IP in that prefix. The routing information is distilled
into a Forwarding Information Base (FIB) that is used
to make packet forwarding decisions. BGP speakers es-
tablish their routing tables by exchanging UPDATE mes-
sages which announce routes (each composed of a prefix
and a bitmask length) along with their corresponding at-
tributes (e.g., AS PATH) and/or withdraw routes that are
no longer available.
Recently, the protocol has been extended to allow for
4-byte AS numbers [42], and thus the messages can
carry the optional AS4 PATH attribute. Legacy routers
that do not understand the 4-byte AS numbers do not at-
tempt to interpret the new attribute and simply pass it
along with their updates.
3.1.2 Implementation
For integrating with BIRD, we made a small number
of changes that fulfill the application requirements for
applying DiCE to BGP. Specifically, (i) we marked the
symbolic inputs (only a few LoC), (ii) we added support
for taking snapshots and managing shadow connections
(about 1300 LoC), and (iii) we exposed certain proper-
ties based on the local state that are queried by the con-
troller in order to detect faults (about 200 LoC). We now
discuss each of the implementation details.
Inputs For the reasons given in Section 2.2.2, we
choose to treat UPDATE messages and policy configu-
ration changes as the basis to derive new inputs during
exploration.
In BGP, UPDATE messages are the main drivers for
state change while the other state changing messages are
only responsible for establishing or tearing down peer-
ings and we leave them for future work. As the format
of BGP messages is well-defined in the RFC [38], we ap-
ply grammar-based fuzzing [22] to the path attributes and
we mark the Network Layer Reachability Info (NLRI)
region of the message as symbolic. An UPDATE mes-
sage can carry several path attributes each of which is
encoded as a type, length, and value field. To fuzz mes-
sage attributes, we create two symbolic inputs for each
attribute present in the initial message4. With respect
to the fuzzed message, we assign to these inputs the
meaning of attribute presence and length, respectively.
In other words, if Oasis picks a non-zero value for the
first input we include the attribute, otherwise we remove
4Except for mandatory attributes which we cannot exclude as a mes-
sage without them is an invalid input.
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Figure 3: DiCE prototype in action. Thin lines correspond
to the checkpoints being created from live state, dashed lines
denote cloned state and connections, and the dash-dotted lines
are DiCE controller actions.
it from the message; the attribute’s length is matched to
the second input. Therefore, Oasis can produce fuzzed
messages based on all combinations that these symbolic
inputs can have. In addition, Oasis can change the con-
tent of the NLRI based on the set of recorded constraints.
We define a further symbolic input that represents
changes to a route preference as it would be caused by a
configuration change. Specifically, this input reflects for
a given route whether that is the most preferred route or
not. Thus, Oasis can explore system behaviors for differ-
ent preferences in the explorer’s route selection process.
Snapshot We use Figure 3 as the guiding example of
DiCE’s operation in one round of exploration. Recall
that the explorer initiates the exploration by triggering
a checkpointing phase which results in the creation of a
consistent snapshot [33] (Figure 3 step 1). In the cur-
rent implementation, this is done by taking a checkpoint
at the explorer and sending an UPDATE message anno-
tated with a custom path attribute (step 1’). Enclosed in
the attribute are the checkpoint number, the IP address
of the explorer, a counter that is decreased at each hop
to confine the exploration scope, and a weight used for
termination detection (explained below).
A router that receives this annotated message inter-
prets the custom attribute and, if this is the first time it
sees the current checkpoint number, it takes a checkpoint
(step 1”). As BIRD runs a single process, the proce-
dure to take a checkpoint is simply implemented using
the fork system call. This way of checkpointing allows
us to create a large number of checkpoints with a small
memory footprint. When a checkpoint is created from
the BIRD process running in production, DiCE isolates
the forked process from its parent by closing the open
sockets5 and marking them as shadow sockets. Also, the
checkpoint is isolated from the FIB. Finally, DiCE opens
a new socket to listen for incoming shadow connections
on a different port from that used by the production in-
5Of course, this does not affect the production instance of BIRD.
stance of BIRD. With some implementation effort, the
same techniques could be applied to other, more com-
plex routing software6.
The dissemination of the checkpoint message is
achieved by announcing a route to a dedicated prefix
so that every router eventually receives the checkpoint-
annotated message. However, the explorer needs to be
acknowledged when the checkpointing phase ends. For
this purpose, we use a variation of the weight-throwing
algorithm for termination detection in a distributed sys-
tem [32]. Briefly, the explorer starts by sending the
checkpointing message with an initial weight (e.g., 1).
When a router receives the message, it keeps a part of
the weight for itself (e.g., weight ·1/(#neighbors+1))
and, while propagating the message, equally shares the
remaining part of the weight among its neighbors. A
router that does not propagate the message further keeps
the received weight for itself. Meanwhile, every router
reports its weight to the controller (step 1”). When the
reported weights sum up to the initial weight the con-
troller concludes termination of checkpointing and starts
exploring by running the Oasis concolic engine.
Exploration Oasis collects constraints along the
branches it encounters in the code. In our prototype, the
constraints come from: (i) the BIRD C code that deals
with UPDATE processing, (ii) the code for fuzzing path
attributes, (iii) the code for injecting policy changes, and
(iv) the BIRD configuration interpreter. Note that BGP
router’s behavior is a result of not only the code but also
configuration. This is why the concolic engine records
constraints for the interpreted configuration. Therefore,
the explored execution paths are comprehensive of both
code and configuration.
To perform path exploration, Oasis negates one con-
straint at a time and produces a new assignment of sym-
bolic inputs (step 2) which are used to drive one exe-
cution of exploration. First, an isolated BIRD process
is forked from the previously established shadow check-
point (step 2’). Recall we term a process forked from
a shadow checkpoint as cloned checkpoint. Before a
message exchange between cloned checkpoints can take
place, a connection is required to be setup. This is done
by connecting7 to the shadow checkpoint of the message
destination (step 2”) which creates a cloned checkpoint
(step 2”’). Note that only one cloned checkpoint per
node is created for each execution: the first connection
is handled by the shadow checkpoint, any subsequent
connection is managed by the cloned checkpoint itself.
Then, messages are exchanged over these connections
(step 3). When it receives the first message, each pro-
6For example, Quagga [6] is structured as a set of processes, one
per routing protocol. DiCE can be applied by controlling per-protocol
shadow connections, and by isolating the processes from the FIB.
7This requires a 2-way handshake to avoid race conditions.
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cess ignores the previously existent information about
the route(s) contained in the message. This is to ensure
that messages are propagated as they would in produc-
tion, because otherwise the BGP selection would ignore
the announcement.
The messages are extended to carry weight informa-
tion so that the same termination detection algorithm de-
scribed before is used to detect BGP convergence in the
cloned snapshot (step 3’). However, routing may not
converge if BGP is in an ill-state [24] within the snap-
shot. Therefore, during exploration, we use the method
in [18] to prevent persistent BGP oscillation under arbi-
trary filtering (explained in Section 4.2). Lack of con-
vergence due to system dynamics (session failures) are
tolerated by shutting down the failed BGP session at the
node at which a BGP error occurs.
When the controller detects that one execution termi-
nates, it queries (step 4) all routers that participated in
the exploration for properties that allow for fault detec-
tion as explained in Section 4. Then, exploration can
progress with another execution based on the next input.
When each execution terminates, the processes involved
in the exploration can terminate as well and release the
resources. The exploration then concludes when Oasis
has covered the paths reachable by controlling the com-
posite set of recorded constraints. At the end of the ex-
ploration all checkpoint processes are terminated as well.
Legacy routers and deployment To capture a system-
wide snapshot, the annotated message has to propagate
through the network and reach all routers within the ex-
ploration scope. This can be easily achieved by reserving
a prefix for this purpose which is announced to trigger the
checkpointing and withdrawn afterwards. This does not
require any modification to BGP because custom route
attributes are allowed in the protocol specifications, mak-
ing it possible to pass-through legacy routers.
DiCE could be deployed incrementally on BGP
routers. An ISP might configure a DiCE-enabled router
to send exploration messages to spare equipment which
can run in isolation and be monitored for observable er-
rors (e.g., through system logs). In addition, an ISP
could check for misconfigurations by deploying a sin-
gle DiCE-enabled route server configured with the ISP
policy and connected with similar machines or DiCE-
enabled routers at the neighboring ISPs.
3.2 Integration with DNS
We now build upon the first case study and describe the
important differences for applying DiCE with another
crucial system for the Internet infrastructure: Domain
Name System (DNS). DNS [34, 35] realizes a name reso-
lution service for the Internet that maps host names to IP
addresses. DNS is a distributed database composed of a
large number of hierarchically organized, autonomously
administered zones, each of which is a subspace of the
global namespace that is authoritative for the names that
share the same suffix with the zone’s domain name. Each
zone maintains a list of so called Resource Records (RRs)
for the domains under the zone’s authority. For example,
the A records map names to IP addresses; the NS records
identify authoritative name servers (ANSs). Typically,
name resolution is carried out by a DNS resolver. In the
basic form, given a name, the resolver queries one of the
ANSs belonging to the name’s domain.
Implementation Using the lessons learned during BGP
integration, it took us less than a week to integrate DiCE
with MaraDNS [2] 2.0.02, an open-source DNS server.
This time includes all the efforts to compile the code-
base, implement light-weight checkpointing, setup an
experimental testbed, read the DNS code, decide what
to make symbolic, and implement the code that drives
exploration. Overall, we added 74 LoC to MaraDNS to
integrate with the concolic engine, and another 78 LoC
to enable symbolic inputs.
We leverage the fact that DNS servers process queries
that do not change their state (we neglect the impact of
caching). This simplifies the integration because the de-
ployed nodes form a snapshot. We only instrument the
recursive resolver, and integrate it with DiCE.
Inputs In DNS, local node actions do not result in state
changes at remote nodes (we do not consider security
exploits). In principle, therefore, a single node cannot
be responsible for an event like system-wide session re-
sets such as in BGP. However, node behavior is not only
driven by code but also by configuration. In the case
of DNS, errors lurking in the system configuration are
an example of a cause of misbehavior that can be prob-
lematic for system reliability (e.g., the impossibility of
resolving certain domains [37]). In the absence of state-
changing operations, subtle misconfigurations manifest
themselves as the result of specific interleaving of node
actions. For DNS, that is the particular path (ordering
of nodes) in which a DNS resolver attempts to resolve a
domain name. Note that this path is also affected by fail-
ures of DNS servers or routing instabilities. We therefore
recognize the importance of achieving systematic explo-
ration of the system-wide execution paths during DNS
resolution.
To drive the exploration, we change the way the re-
solver decides which ANS to query when it has mul-
tiple choices. We introduce a get server() func-
tion that for each ANS list, maintains a subset of active
servers. Each time the resolver needs a server from that
list, the function selects one from the active subset. This
way, DiCE tries all the possible server subsets and all
the possible server combinations. In doing so, it mim-
ics the remote server failures that could cause different
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Figure 4: The topology we used in our BGP experiments with
harmful global events.
local choices, as well as the different random choices in
choosing a server.
4 Evaluation
In this section, we describe the way we evaluated our
DiCE prototype, including a detailed description of the
properties we use to detect faults.
4.1 Experimental setup
BGP setup In our experiments, we make use of a
48-core machine with 64 GB of RAM, running Linux
2.6.30. We install virtual interfaces on this machine, and
use them to configure and run multiple BIRD router in-
stances. We have previously quantified the memory over-
head (37%) and performance impact (8% in a stress test;
negligible in normal operation) of using a concolic en-
gine for path exploration of a BGP router [12].
The 27-router topology we use is shown in Figure 4,
and it corresponds to the topology used in [25]. We
further annotate the topology with link latencies (30 ms
among the routers in the same AS, 5 ms otherwise8) and
link capacities (620 Mbps), and install it into the Mod-
elNet [40] network emulator running FreeBSD 4.9 on a
separate machine. This setup allows us to subject indi-
vidual packets to link latencies and queuing delays that
mimic Internet conditions.
The BIRD instances within an AS are connected in a
full-mesh IBGP (internal BGP) topology, while the inter-
domain protocol is EBGP (external BGP). This setup
does not use route reflectors. The network includes a
mix of AS types (tier-1 ASes, tier-2 ASes and small
stub ASes) interconnected with either customer-provider,
peering or backup relationships as indicated by the ar-
rows in Figure 4. We loaded 319,355 prefixes into the
topology by replaying a BGP trace obtained from Route-
Views (RIB dump plus 15-min updates trace from route-
8This mimics the 60 ms RTT across the continental US an ISP in
the US would experience.
views.eqix at April 1, 2010, 17:28 UTC). BGP policies
were configured as in [25]: if a route is imported from
a customer, it is exported to all neighbors; if a route is
from a peer or provider, it is exported to customers only.
This set of policies adheres to the Gao-Rexford condi-
tions for stable routing [21] and therefore policy-induced
oscillations are not possible. In our network, all ASes
except AS 3 use customer route filtering to prevent their
customers (including customers’ customers and so on)
from injecting advertisements for prefixes they do not
own. We already showed in [12] how concolic execu-
tion can exercise a BGP router’s behavior in a way that
locally exposes potential origin misconfigurations (route
leaks). Because of space limit, we do not present its ex-
tension to a system-wide property.
DNS setup We run 5 nodes in the DNS testbed: one
recursive DNS server and four authoritative ones. The
recursive one uses the “deadwood” resolver from the
MaraDNS software package that we integrated with
DiCE. Other nodes run standard “maradns” servers,
without any source changes. The nodes and their roles
in our DNS experiments are as follows:
• Client: wants to determine the IP address of
foo.dd.aaa and knows only Node1.
• Node1: recursive server. Knows Node2 and Node5.
• Node2: authoritative server for the aaa zone. Pub-
lishes the following NS records for dd.aaa:
1. ns.dd.aaa (Node3)
2. ns2.dd.aaa (Node4)
3. ns3.dd.aaa (unreachable server)
4. ns.dd.bbb (glueless record)
• Node3: authoritative server for the dd.aaa zone. Has
the IP address of foo.dd.aaa
• Node4: redundant authoritative server for
the dd.aaa zone. Has the IP address of
foo.dd.aaa
• Node5: authoritative server for the dd.bbb zone.
Publishes one NS record:
1. ns.dd.aaa (glueless record)
The glueless record is a record that spans different do-
mains without providing “glue” (similar to the A record)
in the form of (name, IP address) that could be used to
reach a name server.
4.2 Testing configuration changes for pos-
sible policy conflicts in BGP
BGP has evolved over time to allow each ISP to indepen-
dently decide on the set of routes that will be announced
to each neighboring AS using a set of policies. These
policies capture business decisions and are often private.
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However, conflicting policies can cause undesired per-
sistent routing oscillations [41] which negatively impact
end-to-end performance of the Internet. We use the case
of checking for the effect of a change in the local policy
to showcase DiCE’s baseline “what-if” testing ability.
Note that policy conflicts are due to a design flaw in
BGP and only by changing the protocol itself the prob-
lem can be definitely addressed. In fact, a recent ap-
proach for resolving policy conflicts advocates changing
BGP [18]. Here we describe our approach for detecting
policy conflicts in a way that does not require protocol
modifications for the production traffic. Detecting con-
flicts is important, for example, to avoid oscillations due
to the use of backup routes that were not checked.
Griffin et al. [24] formally analyzed the Stable Paths
Problem (SPP) which is an abstraction of the problem
that BGP intends to solve in a distributed fashion. They
attribute policy-inflicted oscillations to a circular set of
conflicting rankings between various nodes which form
a dispute wheel. They show that the absence of a dis-
pute wheel ensures the existence of a unique, stable and
robust SPP solution. The work in [21] suggests that
ISPs observe a set of best practices to avoid the dispute
wheel, but these are unnecessarily restrictive and diffi-
cult to check in a distributed fashion. In order to prevent
policy-induced oscillations from occurring, Ee et al. [18]
augment BGP with the global precedence value, which is
carried as an additional attribute in route announcements
and is used as discriminator in the BGP decision process
with higher importance than local policy preferences.
The key idea for detecting policy conflicts is to lever-
age the global precedence value to detect a policy con-
flict in a cloned snapshot while exploring a large number
of possible behaviors. Specifically, we implemented the
global precedence value [18] and we used it to ensure
that the routing protocol converges9. If during conver-
gence a route announcement contains a non-zero global
precedence value, it means that the snapshot contains a
dispute wheel, and therefore a policy conflict exists.
For our experiments with policy conflicts, we con-
struct a 5-node topology presented in [24], known as
GOOD GADGET. This topology presents a Stable Paths
solution. However, a single switch in the ranking of
paths (policy change) transforms it into a BAD GAD-
GET topology that has a dispute wheel.
DiCE successfully detected the possibility of a policy
conflict in this topology by systematically exploring the
consequences of one change at a time in the route prefer-
ence assignments. Overall, there were 75 iterations that
took 39 seconds to explore.
Benefits of using DiCE The ability to detect policy con-
flicts (and the resulting routing oscillations) before they
9Outside of exploration, the usual BGP decision process runs with
the node’s policy and unmodified protocol messages.
happen on the Internet is beneficial for allowing the free-
dom of policy decisions in order to accommodate the
complex objectives that govern route choices for ISPs.
4.3 Testing under failures and random
choices: cyclic dependencies in DNS
Pappas et al., [37] identified three important classes of
configuration errors in DNS, and the one they report be-
ing particularly difficult to identify is the cyclic zone de-
pendency. This error involves configuration of multiple
servers, and importantly, cannot be detected by inspect-
ing the individual server configurations. The error is also
insidious in that in the normal course of operation the
system functions correctly notwithstanding possible de-
lays. However, a particular failure pattern of authorita-
tive servers can cause resolution to take place via other
servers in a domain’s configuration, which then leads to
a cyclic dependency involving two or more servers that
cannot be resolved. This error results in domain names
becoming unresolvable and ultimately unavailable.
Using DiCE’s second testing mode (the choice func-
tion) we successfully detected a cyclic dependency in our
testbed after executing 502 explorations that took 532
seconds. The cyclic dependency is locally detected at
the resolver. In this case, the get server() function
chooses an execution path in which Node3 and Node4
are not queried (e.g., because they are considered to have
failed). Query resolution proceeds via Node5, but unfor-
tunately Node5 redirects the query back to Node2, where
the same decision to avoid Node3 and Node4 is made
again and again. The cyclic dependency would manifest
itself in the production system if Node3 and Node4 were
both to fail. This experiment demonstrates how DiCE
systematically explores system behavior under possible
failures in a case when it is not possible, or difficult, to
cause these failures to occur in the production system.
4.4 Testing BGP router code for possibly
causing harmful global events
To showcase DiCE’s ability to systematically use the
code itself to test it, we install a property that checks
for the presence of a particular event at a global scale,
akin to emergent behavior. An example that affected
BGP is the session reset problem [4]. The core of the
problem is the fact that the affected routers had diffi-
culty handling an update in which the AS4 PATH at-
tribute had zero (0) length. The router receiving such
an update would not crash, but it would reset the ses-
sion with the sender of the message. In strict isolation,
this seemingly valid handling of a semantically confus-
ing message would not have a far-reaching impact. Un-
fortunately, a large fraction of routers were not affected
by this programming error and were effectively multi-
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casting the session reset signal. Each session reset is
followed by a new session establishment that triggers a
full routing table download and route processing that is
CPU intensive. Moreover, the routing updates containing
the confusing AS4 PATH attributes would then be rede-
livered to the affected routers, causing another round of
session resets, and so on. As a result, the peak update
traffic in the Internet was increased by more than a fac-
tor of 10 (1000%) [4]. Operators had to manually install
packet filters to prevent this fault from recurring.
To enable DiCE to detect this type of a fault, we install
the property which signals a possible fault whenever a
router resets the session (seen as an increase in the BGP
error count) in response to an exploratory message. To
trigger this fault in our testbed, we replicate the previ-
ously described scenario [4] to the extent possible as we
do not have access to the Cisco IOS code. We introduce
code into BIRD (already 4-byte AS-compliant) that re-
sets the session when a zero-length AS4 PATH attributes
arrives. The routers that are configured to be affected by
the confusing attributes are marked with a circle in Fig-
ure 4. Note that AS 165053 is using a 4-byte AS num-
ber. The update containing the zero-length AS4 PATH
was generated using a fuzzed message.
Detection results We instructed the routers in our
testbed to perform exploration after finishing loading the
319,355 prefixes. The routers use an actual message to
record the constraints. Different routers explore a differ-
ent number of iterations on the same code because of the:
1) different messages that end up being used to initially
record the constraints, and 2) different C code that gets
instantiated by BIRD to enforce the filtering commands.
However, Oasis reported that it had explored all paths at
each router. The maximum number of explorations was
2002, minimum was 7 while the average number was 763
and std. dev. of 586. Routers 23 and 27 explored with 7
inputs because they only accept a default route and have
no filtering enabled. The maximum observed time was
670 s to explore the total of 1156 explorations. The av-
erage time to explore was 243 s with a std. dev. of 204 s.
We also measured the exploration time without account-
ing for network delays by repeating the experiments with
the same initial messages, but without Modelnet. Over-
all, the times are smaller with an average of 155 s and
std. dev. of 113 s.
Given the timescale over which the Internet incidents
occurred due the erroneous configuration files and soft-
ware (likely to be in place for weeks if not months), the
time DiCE took to detect these faults is negligible.
Benefits of using DiCE Armed with a property that
checks the BGP error count (which can be increased due
to a variety of different reasons), DiCE produces a list
of possible actions that can cause the systemwide error
count to go over the threshold. Each ISP would ben-
efit from this advance warning and could take a num-
ber of actions, including: 1) notifying the router vendor
and requesting a patch, 2) manually fixing the code if the
source is available, and 3) automatically installing filters
to filter out the offending message (if the action is caused
by message). Without DiCE, this kind of repair was un-
dertaken only after the reset incident took place across
the Internet and was diagnosed after several hours [4].
5 Related Work
Model checking. CrystalBall [44], and MODIST
[45] represent the state-of-the-art in model checking
distributed system implementations. CrystalBall [44]
proactively predicts inconsistencies that can occur in a
running distributed system due to unknown program-
ming errors, and effectively prevents them. It works for
systems implemented in the Mace [29] framework. Crys-
talBall nodes periodically collect a consistent snapshot of
system state, and locally run a model checking heuristic
on the set of state machines instantiated from the snap-
shot. MODIST [45] is capable of model checking un-
modified distributed systems. One could use MODIST
to orchestrate state space exploration across a cluster of
machines in an isolated (non-deployed) scenario.
DiCE goes beyond these approaches in several impor-
tant aspects because it: 1) can uncover faults due to in-
puts that are different than those fed by the model check-
ing harness, 2) deals with the issues arising from federa-
tion (need for privacy, inability to retrieve state and con-
figuration), and 3) incorporates the intrinsic heterogene-
ity of the system (nodes behave differently either due to
different implementations, or configurations).
Symbolic execution. Symbolic [11] and concolic ex-
ecution [10, 17, 23] are effective in discovering bugs in
single-machine code by trying to achieve complete cov-
erage of possible code paths. However, they are limited
in their ability to reach faulty states as they cannot handle
large inputs in long-running systems and realistic config-
uration (e.g., Klee [11] works with only several bytes of
input to achieve good path coverage). In addition, these
engines are only successful in searching for violations of
local assertions (e.g., memory violations). Thus, without
the spatial awareness achieved by DiCE, it is not possible
to judge the system-wide impact of node actions.
KleeNet [39] builds a test harness that accommodates
messaging and fault injection on top of Klee [11]. To
search for bugs, KleeNet arranges for path exploration
among the set of TinyOs nodes running in isolation on
one machine, prior to deployment. This approach is thus
similar in spirit to model checking that starts from initial
state, along with the shortcomings in dealing with long-
running, federated, and heterogeneous systems.
Relative to symbolic execution approaches, DiCE: 1)
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explores system behavior starting from live state and
configuration which is crucial for overcoming the path
explosion problem in long-running systems, 2) provides
a way to control inputs to a single node that explore rel-
evant federated system states, 3) adapts to the federated
environments by providing a narrow interface for shar-
ing the information of local checks, and 4) accommo-
dates system heterogeneity by allowing each administra-
tive domain to separately integrate DiCE.
There have been proposals for performing path explo-
ration at selected points in time on a single-machine [15].
Extending this work to handle networked systems require
developer’s involvement in eliminating inconsistent or
impossible states. DiCE provides this information nat-
urally, using the system itself. We have highlighted chal-
lenges of fault detection in federated, heterogeneous sys-
tems [13]. DiCE is a system that addresses these chal-
lenges. In our short paper [12], we present a preliminary
DiCE design, and detail our experiences in integrating a
BGP router with a concolic execution engine. This pa-
per goes beyond our short paper in that it: 1) shows how
to carefully checkpoint the system to allow the concolic
engine to extend its reach across the network, 2) shows
how to control the inputs to the concolic engine to enable
it to reach relevant federated system states, 3) includes
a privacy-preserving scheme for checking properties, 4)
presents a disjoint set of experimental results involving
BGP, and 5) details our experience of integrating DiCE
with DNS, along with the accompanying experimental
results.
MAX [31] uses symbolic execution to find protocol
manipulation attack which can be harmful to a network
participant. In contrast, DiCE determines the impact of a
node’s actions on the remainder of the system.
Castro et al., [14] use symbolic execution and con-
straint solving to randomize inputs that cause application
crashes in an effort to improve privacy of bug reports.
DiCE applies a similar idea, but to a different domain
and for new functionality (fault detection).
Application-specific fault detection and prevention
Tools that look for faults in the set of router configu-
rations using static analysis [19] can be quite effective,
but cannot check live state spanning multiple nodes, and
their configuration (which can differ from the statically
checked files). The work on NetReview [25] posits that
is difficult to prevent all classes of faults, and argues that
the best we can do for the general case is to detect faults
in BGP after they occur. DiCE goes one step further in
that it detects important classes of faults before they man-
ifest themselves.
Alimi et al. advocate use of shadow configuration as
a network management primitive [7]. This approach in-
stalls an alternative configuration within a single ISP’s
routers, and checks its validity. DiCE’s shadow snap-
shot bears resemblance to this “shadow config” primi-
tive, but: 1) is lightweight (works on existing router pro-
cesses), 2) is automatically created without operator in-
volvement post-deployment, 3) can span multiple ISPs,
and 4) serves to detect faults due to unanticipated in-
puts [4], bugs, or operator mistakes before they are tried
out or put into effect. DiCE can benefit from virtual net-
work substrates (e.g., [9]) to simplify shadow and cloned
snapshot creation.
Bug-Tolerant Routers [27] run multiple router imple-
mentations in parallel using virtualization, and mask
faults by voting and changing the environment of the
router processes. In contrast, DiCE possesses the neces-
sary spatial awareness to detect semantic faults that span
multiple routers, systematically explores node behavior,
and does not require multiple router implementations.
Proposals exist for dealing with specific BGP faults,
e.g., oscillations [18]. We argue that it is better to detect
a large class of faults before they occur. It is then possi-
ble to devise general or specific solutions for preventing
them. Our work is complementary to the numerous secu-
rity extensions to BGP (e.g., [28]) which prevent certain
classes of attacks. However, these works cannot guard
against programming errors or policy conflicts.
Pappas et al., [36] have proposed and implemented
a third-party tool that periodically downloads DNS re-
source records belonging to a large number of domains,
and checks them for cyclic dependencies (as well as other
misconfigurations). We demonstrate DiCE’s ability to
automatically accomplish a similar task within DNS it-
self, where there is a clear incentive for the DNS admin-
istrators to identify and eliminate cyclic dependencies.
6 Conclusions
We presented the design and implementation of DiCE, a
system for detecting faults in the long-running, heteroge-
neous, and federated distributed systems. DiCE enables
system operators to first specify properties that capture
the desired system behavior. DiCE then: 1) automati-
cally and systematically explores a large number of rele-
vant executions, 2) checks their system-wide impact in
isolation while respecting privacy among different ad-
ministrative entities, and 3) reports safety property vi-
olations. We integrated DiCE with two systems crucial
for Internet’s operation: BGP and DNS. This paper de-
scribes the lessons we learned on how to control inputs
fed to nodes in order to explore relevant system-wide
state. Our evaluation demonstrates DiCE’s effectiveness
and ease of integration with existing software written in
C. Specifically, our prototype quickly detects faults that
can occur due to policy conflicts, misconfigurations, and
programming faults.
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A Anonymous property checks
We now describe a proof-of-concept scheme that uses a
protocol for Secure Multy-Party Computation (SMPC)
based on the threshold variant of Paillier’s cryptosys-
tem in [20]. Let D denote the set of participating do-
mains, Nj be the nodes of domain j ∈ D. We assume
there exists an out-of-band mechanism for disseminat-
ing a shared public key PK and a list of private keys
SK1, · · · , SK‖D‖. Each domain j sends the cyphertext
EPK(
∑
i∈Nj
[f(Θi)]) to all other domains. Next, each
domain leverages the homomorphic property of the cryp-
tosystem [20] to compute c = EPK(
∑
i∈N [f(Θi)]) =∏
j∈D EPK(
∑
i∈Nj
[f(Θi)]). The decryption of c is
shared across all domains. Specifically, each domain j
runs a decryption algorithm using SKj that produces a
decryption share cj and sends it to other domains. Fi-
nally, each domain inputs cj , ∀j to a combiner algorithm
that outputs
∑
i∈N [f(Θi)]. Comparing this value with
the threshold th gives the global check.
We implemented the above protocol in Java using
“thep”10 as a starting point. We ran a micro-benchmark
to evaluate its performance using the same experimen-
tal setup used for BGP. With respect to the experimen-
tal topology (Figure 4), we only used one node per AS
because we assume that nodes inside the same domain
would trust each other. In summary, we obtained that the
times needed for one secure computation are 417 ms and
1979 ms for running without and with ModelNet, respec-
tively. This result leads us to a conclusion that a version
of DiCE prototype supporting SMPC should implement
secure computations as a pipeline running in parallel to
the system exploration process, and batch multiple com-
putations together.
10A Java implementation of Paillier’s cryptosystem http://
code.google.com/p/thep/.
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